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Civil Procedure – Order for a New Trial 
Summary 
Consolidated appeals from the Eighth Judicial District Court order granting a new trial in a tort 
action and from post-judgment orders regarding an award of attorney fees and costs. 
Disposition/Outcome 
The Court reversed both the District court’s judgment granting a new trial and the award of 
attorney fees and costs because there was no contemporaneous objection when the asserted 
instances of attorney misconduct occurred. 
Factual and Procedural History 
 Alyson Roth (“Roth’) was involved in a single-car rollover accident.  At the time of the 
accident, Jennifer Stapleton (“Stapleton”) was driving Roth’s BMW while Roth slept in the front 
seat.  The car strayed off the side of the road, swerved back across the highway, and then rolled 
into the desert before landing on its roof.  Roth was ejected from the car and suffered a spinal 
cord injury that rendered her paraplegic. 
 Roth sued Stapleton for negligence and BMW for strict product liability.  Roth alleged 
that although she was wearing her seatbelt, defects in BMW’s safety restraint system allowed her 
to be thrown from the car.  Roth’s experts testified that roof support between the car’s front and 
rear side windows separated from the roof rail during the crash, causing Roth’s seatbelt to 
become slack. BMW countered that Roth was not wearing her seatbelt and was ejected from the 
passenger window before the vehicle began its second roll. 
 Prior to trial, Roth filed a motion in limine requesting that the court allow her to present 
evidence she was wearing her seatbelt, and prohibit BMW from presenting evidence to the 
contrary.  Roth based her motion on Nevada’s Seatbelt Statute that prohibits a fact-finder from 
considering evidence that a party was not wearing a seatbelt when determining causation or 
negligence in a civil action.
2
   However, the district court found that in order for Roth to establish 
the seatbelt was defective, she also had to prove that she was wearing the seatbelt at the time of 
the collision.  Thus, BMW was entitled to present evidence that Roth was not wearing her 
seatbelt to defend itself against Roth’s crashworthiness claim.  Before opening statements,  the 
district court gave the jury a limiting instruction, ordering it to only consider evidence suggesting 
Roth was not wearing her seatbelt for the purpose of evaluating Roth’s claim that the subject 
vehicle was defective and unreasonably dangerous.   
 Throughout the trial, argued extensively on whether  Roth was belted and how she was 
thrown from the car.   However, Roth did not object to BMW’s claims that she was not wearing 
her seatbelt until BMW made the assertion during closing arguments.  The district court 
sustained the objection on the basis the comment was too broad and in violation of the order in 
limine.  The court then struck the statement and reread the limiting instruction.  Roth again 
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  NEV. REV. STAT. § 484D.496(4) (2007). 
objected during closing arguments when BMW opined that Roth’s structural defect claims were 
“red herrings” because Roth was not wearing her seatbelt.  The court sustained the objection and 
directed BMW to clarify its statement.  BMW did so by emphasizing that the evidence showed 
that Roth was not wearing her seatbelt so there was no proof that a defect in the seatbelt caused 
Roth’s injuries. 
 The jury found that Stapleton was negligent in causing Roth’s injuries.  The jury also 
found, by answering special interrogatories, that the vehicle was not defective.  Because the jury 
found that the vehicle was not defective, they never reached the issue of causation. 
 Roth filed a motion for a new trial pursuant to N.R.C.P. 59(a)(2), which allows the court 
to grant  a new trial if the prevailing party engaged in misconduct that materially affects the 
substantial rights of the aggrieved party.
3
  The district court found that BMW intentionally, 
repeatedly, consistently and persistently violated the order in limine during voir dire, opening 
statements and closing arguments and therefore granted the motion for a new trial.  
Discussion 
Attorney Misconduct Under N.R.C.P. 59(a)(2) 
 Justice Pickering, writing for the Court sitting en banc, stated that an attorney’s violation 
of an order in limine can amount to misconduct, sufficient to justify a new trial under NRCP 
59(a)(2), if the standards of Lioce v. Cohen
4
  are met.  The Court reviews attorney’s comments 
for misconduct de novo.  The three elements that must be satisfied for a new trial due to attorney 
misconduct are that the order in limine must be specific in its prohibition, the violation must be 
clear, and unfair prejudice affecting the reliability of the verdict must be shown.   
 The Court held that the standard a district court is to apply for a motion for a new trial 
based on misconduct depends on whether or not the counsel objected to the misconduct during 
trial.
5
  For objected-to misconduct, a party moving for a new trial bears the burden of 
demonstrating that the conduct is so extreme that objection, admonishment and curative 
instruction cannot remove its effect.
6
  If the misconduct is not objected to, the district court 
should deem the issue waived unless it is plain error.  Moreover, the court emphasized that usual 
deference to the lower court’s findings was not owed if the lower court committed a legal error.    
 The Court examined each of the three instances of attorney misconduct that the district 
court identified.  First the Court examined the alleged misconduct during voir dire.  During voir 
dire, BMW stated that “plaintiff claims she was seatbelted [and] BMW claims that the physical 
evidence shows that she was not wearing her seatbelt.”  The district court admonished BMW’s 
attorney to refrain from arguing the case.  Roth pointed to this as an example of BMW’s 
misconduct violating the motion in limine.  The district court found that this was misconduct, but 
the Supreme Court found this “clearly erroneous” because the order in limine allowed the 
introduction of seatbelt evidence.  
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 The Court next examined the four instances during opening statements that the district 
court found to be violations of the order in limine.  Roth did not object at each instance and the 
district court did not admonish BMW’s counsel sua sponte for making the comments.  
Nevertheless, the district court viewed the instances as objected-to misconduct under Lioce, 
because its order in limine and associated limiting instruction were definitive and clear.  
Furthermore, the district held that Roth’s motion in limine constituted adequate objection to what 
it found were BMW’s violations of the order.  
  The Court found the district court in error on both counts.  The order was definitive in 
permitting evidence to be introduced on Roth’s behalf, but not definitive or specific as to the 
limitations imposed on the use of seatbelt evidence.  Additionally, while Roth’s motion in limine 
may have preserved her objection to the admission of the seatbelt evidence, that objection was 
neither the basis for her appeal or the order granting it.  A contemporaneous objection is required 
to claim misconduct associated with an asserted violation of an order in limine.   
Order in Limine does not Serve as a Continuing Objection 
 The Court next considered whether the Lioce requirement to object to a party’s violation 
of an order in limine to preserve the error for a subsequent motion for a new trial was consistent 
with Richmond v. State.
8
  Richmond held that once an objection had been fully briefed and the 
district court decided on the motion, the motion in limine is preserved for appeal.
9
  Lioce, on the 
other hand, generally held that, regardless of a motion in limine, unobjected-to attorney 
misconduct is waived unless it constitutes plain error.
10
  However, the Court stated that whether 
an order in limine preserves error depends on whether the alleged error violates the court’s 
previous ruling on the motion.   The Court concluded that an objection is required when an 
opposing party or the court violates an order in limine. 
Objections would have Clarified the Order in Limine 
 The Court next examined the conferences held before and during closing arguments as 
examples of the confusion over the limitations that the order in limine placed on arguments.  The 
Court noted that the order in limine lacked specificity because the law regarding when seatbelt 
evidence can be introduced in a crashworthiness case is unclear.  Although, the Court did not 
clarify the law regarding seatbelt evidence, it did note that objecting to BMW’s statements would 
have prompted the district court to clarify what the order in limine actually allowed and 
prohibited.  The Court ultimately reaffirmed that a fully briefed and definitively ruled-on motion 
in limine on an evidentiary question preserves error for challenges to whether the district court 
properly ruled on the motion. However, the motion in limine itself does not serve as an objection 
for violation of the order in limine, including attorney misconduct for that violation. 
 The Court reviewed the two objected-to statements during closing arguments. BMW’s 
first objected to statement was that Roth was not wearing her seatbelt, so a defective seatbelt 
could not have caused her injuries.  The Court found that this statement did not violate the order 
in limine and thus did not constitute misconduct.  The second objected to comment that BMW 
made was Roth’s defective seatbelt claims were “red herrings” because Roth was not wearing 
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her seatbelt.   At trial, Roth’s objection to this statement was sustained, and the jury was 
instructed to disregard the statement.  BMW clarified the statement, and Roth did not object to 
the clarified statement.   The court questioned whether this statement was indeed improper, but 
because the admonition and instruction occurred so quickly, the court analyzed that statement as 
involving objected-to and admonished misconduct under Lioce.
12
   
 In Lioce, the Court reasoned that when a party moves for a trial they must demonstrate 
that the objected-to and admonished misconduct were so extreme that objection and misconduct 
could not remove the misconduct’s effect.13  Here, the objected-to misconduct did not warrant a 
new trial because the admonishment and instruction sufficiently cured the misconduct.  
 The Court reversed the order for a new trial and consequently reversed the award of 
attorney fees and costs as well. 
Conclusion 
 Three elements are required for a violation of an order in limine to constitute attorney 
misconduct requiring a new trial under N.R.C.P. 59(a)(2).  The order in limine must be specific, 
the violation must be clear, and unfair prejudice must be shown.  The standards of review set 
forth in Lioce apply where a new trial is sought under N.R.C.P. 59(a)(2).   
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